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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTED. 
To grant a summary judgment in this matter, the trial Court must determine that there 
are absolutely no genuine issue of material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. "Summary judgment is proper only when 'the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.'" Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 2005 UT 82, % 12 (quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c)). 'The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are 
viewed] in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (quoting Arnold Indus., 
Inc.v. Love, 2002 UT 133, PI 1, 63 P.3d 721); see also, Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 
(Utah 1991); and Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818P.2d 1316,1319 (Utah App.1991). 
The question of fact is whether Appellants (Greer's) Counsel filed the complamt in 
the rear drop box at the Third District Court, Matheson Courthouse on November 28,2005. 
That question was raised in the pleadings of Appellant in Reply Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. "Plaintiffs counsel's copy of the complamt 
bears a date stamp of November 28,2005. That is when the original Complaint was placed 
in the pleading receptacle....November 28, 2005 is the date that it was placed in the 
receptacle and should be the date it should be considered filed.."(R.91) This statement by 
Greer's counsel is a statement under Rule 11 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by an officer of 
the court and as such has the same standing as a declaration or affidavit. 
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To defeat Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, there must be a genuine issue 
of material fact. See Shaw Res. Ltd, LLC v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 Ut App. 
313, P. 22 (2006). Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because a question of 
fact was raised by Greer's pleading. Plaintiffs counsel stated in his pleadings that he placed 
the Complaint in the pleadings drop box for the Third District Court at the Matheson court 
house on November 28,2005. This is a personal fact known only by Plaintiffs counsel 1 he 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11(b), as amended in 1997, states 
(b) Representation to Court. By presenting a pleading, w ritten motion, or 
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is ccrifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery; 
In Plaintiffs counsel Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R.l 17-119), stated the fact that the complaint was placed in the 
I eceptaclc at the rear of the Matheson Court House on the November 28,2005. That is w hy 
Plaintiffs counsel's copy of the Complaint bears a date stamp of November 28, 2005 By 
stating this in the pleadings under Rule 11, it has the same effect as if it was an affidavit. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of 15 P.3d 1021 Morse v. Packer 2000 UT 86 stated, 
"Rule 11 places an affirmative duty on attorneys and litigants to make a 
reasonable investigation (under the circumstances) of the facts and the law 
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before sighing and submitting any pleading, motion, or other paper," 2 
James Win, Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 1 Lll[2][a] (Matthew 
Bender, 3d ed.2000). 
Plaintiffs Counsel knew that the complaint had been placed in the receptacle on November 
28, 2005 and slated so in his Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R,l 17-1 19), Plaintiffs counsel is an ofilcer of the court. In the case 
of James Jess on behalf of Dino A Morel I i on Habeas Corpus, 1970.CA.40288, 11 
Cal.App.3d 819;91 Cal.Rptr. 72, the California Appellate court stated that, 
"a statement of the facts: by such a judicial officer as an alternative to an 
affidavit of the fact made by someone not such a judicial officer. Thus, the 
portion of the supporting papers indicating that Morelli had been served 
with the subpoena duces tecum, demanded and received witness fees, and 
failed to appear at the required time and place was supplied by the 
certificate of the reporter. Any elements of the contempt which were 
derived from the declaration of plaintiffs' attorney met the requirements of 
section 1211, Code of Civil Procedure, because his declaration was given 
under penalty of perjury, which by Code of Civil Procedure, section 2015.5 
is satisfactory substitute for an affidaxit. 
That is exactly what is present here. Plaintiffs Counsel, as an officer of the court 
made a statement of fact, under the penalty of Rule 11. That qualifies as an 
affidavit and under the new rules allowing a declaration to be used in place of an 
affidavit, it definitely is the same as a declaration.. In BIG 5 's Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment in its Statement of Facts states "The copy of the 
complaint that was served on Big 5 bears a Third District date stamp dated 
November 28, 2005."(K 78). This statement of fact by Defendant is sufficient to 
laise a question of fact in and of itself. As such there is a question of fact before the 
court and summary judgment cannot be granted. 
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POINT 2: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE TOLLED DUE TO A 
STATUTORY PROHIBITION FOR A PERIOD FROM JUNE 12, 2003 TO 
NOVEMBER 3,2003 AS TO BIG 5 BECAUSE BIG 5 WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE AND 
AS SUCH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN THE STATE, 
There is no question that §78B~2-307 (formerly §78-12-25) is applicable to this case. 
It requires the complaint to be brought within 4 years. However, the legislature provided 
§78B-2-l 12 (formerly §78-12-41) and §78B-2~104 (formerly §78-12-35) as tolling statutes 
to, in effect, extend the statute of limitations. §78B-2-104 states: 
78B-2-104. Effect of absence from state. 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state, the 
action maybe commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to 
the state. If after a cause of action accrues the person departs from the state, the time 
of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
In the present case, the facts are that Big 5 Certificate of Incorporation was forfeited, 
in its home state of Delaware pursuant to Delaware Statute § 136. BIG 5 did not have a 
Certificate of Incorporation. It was out of existence for the period of June 12, 2003 to 
November 3, 2003, a period of 144 days. If Big 5 was not in existence as a legal entity 
during this period, it cannot be present in this statc.(R.94-95) Therefore, it was absent from 
the state of Utah from June 12, 2003 to November 3, 2003, a period of 144 days. §78B-2-
104 states clearly that if a person (corporation) is absent from the state, that period of absence 
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is not part of the time limited for commencement of the action. That is even if he could have 
been served out of state under the long ami statute. See Arnold v Grigshy, 2008 UTCA 
20060481-022808. Greer had an additional 144 days after December 1, 2005 to file his 
complaint. Hence, the statute of limitations had not run, even if the date of the filing is 
considered to be December 2, 2005. 
Further, §78B-2-112 states: 
78B-2-112. Effect of injunction or prohibition. 
The duration of an injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an 
action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
A forfeiture of a Certificate of Incorporation is a statutory prohibition because it terminates 
the existence of the corporation for the period it was forfeited.. Big 5 as a corporation did 
not exist under Delaware law and the 144 days should not be counted as part of the limitation 
period.. Again, the statute of limitations had not run, even if the date of the filing is 
considered to be December 2, 2005, instead of the correct one of November 28, 2005. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court incorrectly granted Defendant summary judgment when a question 
of fact existed. Plaintiffs counsel, as an officer of the court and subject to Rule 11, 
stated from his own personal knowledge that the Complaint was fled on November 28, 
2005 by placing in the drop box at the rear of the Matheson Courthouse. That is why his 
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copy bore the date stamp of November 28, 2005. That fact is confinned by a statement of 
fact by Defendant in its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. Under Rule 1 1, 
Plaintiffs counsel5 statement is a declaration or akin to an affidavit. As such it is 
sufficient to raise the question of fact to defeat Defendant's summary judgment. 
Additionally, BIG 5 did not exist for a period of 144 days during the limitation's 
period. \s such it was not in existence, hence it could not have been in the state of Utah. 
Therefore, the statute should be tolled for this period. This is even though the defunct 
corporation could be served. This is similar to the statute tolling when an individual is out 
of the state, even though he could be served under the long arm statute, Hven though the 
corporation articles of incorporation were forfeited, taking it out of existence for 144 
days, a registered agent could have still been served. However, Big 5 failed to exist, that 
is it can no longer exist in the state of Utah or anywhere else during that period of time. 
Hence, il was absent from the state and the statute of limitations should be tolled. 
Respectively submitted this /y of February 2009. 
T HOLLAND 
3# South West Temple 
t Lake City, Utah 84115 
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